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I. INTRODUCTION 
One determinant of market performance 
is the ability of new firms to enter mar­
kets. It is generally argued that the 
fewer the restrictions on entry, ceteris 
paribus, the more competitive a market 
will tend to be.l1 Entry in the commercial 
banking market is restricted on at least 
two levels. One is that new entrants are 
required to obtain charters from either 
the Comptroller of the Currency or the 
state banking authority. The other is 
that the ability of a bank to branch is 
constrained by the branching laws of the 
state. Before one may recommend solu­
tions to problems of performance in the 
commercial banking industry, an analy­
sis of the effect from these barriers to 
entry on performance must be per­
formed. Further than this, it is neces­
sary to know if there exist different im­
pacts from these two levels of entry bar­
riers before specific solutions to policy 
problems may be made. 
This paper provides a test of the hy­
pothesis that increased market entry 
into the commercial banking industry, 
ceteris paribus, will improve the per­
formance of the industry. Performance 
differen­is measured as the size of the 
. tial between interest rates charged on 
loans between geographical areas, after 
controlling for differences in growth, 
borrower risk, and term to maturity 
characteristics. Tests are also made to 
determine whether or not it makes a 
difference if entry is by new firms or by 
new branches of existing firms. The re­
sults of these tests provide us with im­
plications for reform of the entry re­
strictions on financial firms. 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THE
 
DATASET
 
Research on the competitive character­
istics of banking markets generally esti­
mate the effects of the number of firms 
and deposit concentration ratios on 
interest~  rates for loans. Kaufman (1966), 
Aspinwallm  (1970), and Davis and Ver­
brugge (1978) find the number of firms 
to be a significant and negative deter­
minant of interest rate differentials be­
tween areas. Edwards (1%4), Aspinwall 
(1970), and Davis and Verbrugge (1978) 
conclude that concentration ratios are a 
significant and positive determinant of 
interest rate differentials between areas. 
Rhoades (1980) concludes that new 
entry by firms does not exert a signifi­
cant impact upon the mobility and turn­
over of the top five firms in 184 banking 
markets. 
Three problems associated with pre­
vious research are addressed here. 
First, entry is only addressed in 
Rhoades (1980). All other studies re­
gress the actual number of firms on 
interest rates and not the change in the 
number of firms over the previous 
years. While Rhoades (1980) considers 
the entry of firms as an independent 
variable, the dependent variable of the 
regression equation is not an interest 
rate. Rather, mobility and turnover 
(1965).1 For example, see Bain 0%5)  
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characteristics of firms are the depen­
dent variables used as proxies for com­
petition in the banking industry. The 
present study uses an interest rate as the 
dependent variable since it is clearly a 
form of price competition, while mobil­
ity and turnover are more the result of 
competition rather than a type of com­
petition. Possibly, the reason why 
Rhoades (1980) does not find a signifi­
cant relationship between entry and 
competition is due to this specification 
of competition. 
A second problem is that markets are 
defined as only one form of financial 
firm. With the exception of Davis and 
Verbrugge (1978), which considers sav­
ings and loan associations, all the 
studies restrict the market only to com­
mercial banks. Since very few banks are 
virtual monopolists in their geographical 
areas, one need consider a wider defini­
tion of a market that includes all kinds 
of firms which are active participants. 
Therefore, previous studies may have 
misspecified their models of competition 
in banking markets. This paper consid­
ers the home mortgage market of 1975 in 
39 Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (SMSAs).2 The choice of the 39 
SMSAs is constrained by the unavail­
ability of data on mutual savings banks 
which made it necessary to consider only 
those SMSAs without mutual savings 
banks. In addition, SMSAs that are lo­
cated in unit-banking states are not in­
cluded in this sample because branching 
is prohibited by law. The exclusion of 
SMSAs with unit-banking laws allows 
for comparison of only those areas 
where entry is of two types: De novo 
and branching. The use of this sample 
allows for a test of a market where both 
commercial banks and savings and loan 
associations are participants,, and it pro­
vides for a clearer analysis of perfor­
mance than previous studies which only 
consideri  one kindi  of financiali i l firm.i . 
A third problem c.oncerns the defini­
tion of the number of rivals: The' num­
ber of main offices or the number of 
branches. Aspinwall (970), Davis and 
Verbrugge (978) and Rhoades (1980) use 
the former measure based on the argu­
ment that an increase in the number of 
branches is a form of nonprice competi­
tion. Longbrake and Peterson (1979) use 
the number of different institutions in a 
market, which includes market deposits 
of branch offices of institutions head­
quartered outside the market. It is ar­
gued that branching does not serve to 
increase price competition because all 
the branches of a firm offer the same 
prices. In this case, branching is viewed 
as nonprice competition in the form of 
convenience to customers and may end 
up exerting a positive impact on prices 
due to its being a cost of production.3 
Thus, the number of branches, ceteris 
paribus, may exert a positive impact 
upon prices. 
While this argument appears reason­
able, another possibility comes to mind. 
Since branching adds to the sheer num­
ber of competitors of rival firms, 
branching may serve to lower interest 
rates, ceteris paribus, as displayed in 
the competitive market model of eco­
nomics. Since the transaction between 
the borrower and lender of mortgage 
funds is usually a one-time transaction, 
convenience in the form of branches has 
little to do with mortgage interest rates. 
Even if branching was for the conve­
nience of customers, new banks which 
decide not to branch could enter mar­
kets where the existing firms did operate 
branches and underprice their com­
petitors. In this case, the long-run com­
petitive situation would be characterized 
by branching if it serves as a means of 
decreasing production costs and interest 
rates.. This is the economies-of-scale ar­
gument.. Thus,, the number of branches,, 
ceterist i  paribus,i , may exertt a negativeti  
impacti t upon prices.i . Sincei  theret  are 
conflictingli ti  ideasi  on thet  specificationi i ti  of 
thist i  variable,i l , thist i  issuei  becomes an em­
piricali i l question.ti . 
Ill. MODELS AND TESTS  
The following reduced-form equation  of  
interest rate determination is estimated.4  
R =	 r(P, LV,  TM, MS,  Eii ) 0)  
where 
R = effective interest  rate on home  
mortgages 
P = percentage change in population  
from 1974 to 1975 
LV  = loan-to-value ratio 
TM  = term to maturity 
MS  = firms per population at  begin­
ning of  the period of  analysis  
Ei = entry variables 
E1 = percentage change in the  num­
ber  of  main offices of  commer­
cial banks and savings and loan  
associations for various years  
~ =	 percentage change in the  num­
ber  of  branches  of  commercial  
banks and savings and loan  as­
sociations for various years.  
2	 The data  set is from Federal  Home''Loan  Bank  
Board (1979). This set  consists  of  a survey  of  all 
qualifying loans in 1975 for single-family,  non­
farm, conventional mortgages closed  during  the  
frrst five working days  of  the month.  The  sample  
used here includes commercial banks,  savings  and  
loan associations,  and  mortgage bankers,  and  the  
data are calculated  as annual averages  for  all re­
ported loans by SMSA. 
3 It could also be argued  that  there  exist  certain  
economies of  scale which result  from branching
and serve  to  lower  interest  rates.  Gilbert  and  
Longbrake (1974) present  a detailed  evaluation  of  
the effects of  branching  on the  productive  effi­
ciency of  financial institutions.  Evidence  is pre­
sented  for  the  conclusion  that  organizational  
structure  does  influence  the  cost  of  producing
various services but that no one  form of  structure  
is superior overall. For  example,  in the  case  of  
real estate  loans,, the above study  finds that  there  
exist lower costs  in branch  offices versus  produc­
tion in the main office.. On the  other  hand,, Long­
brake and Peterson  (1979) find that  market  struc­
turet  and organizationali ti l structuret t  variablesi l  do  nott 
exertt significanti i i t impactsi t  upon regionali l mortgaget  
ratet  differentials.i ti l . Whileil  thist i  issuei  of economiesi  of  
scalel  ini  bankingi  isi  unsettledttl  ini  thet  literature,lit t , itit isi  
argued here  thatt t thet  samplel  isi  restrictedt i t  tot  onlyl  
non-unit-bankingit i  areas  and  thatt t frrms enjoyj  simi­i i
larl  economiesi  of  scale.l . In othert  words,, thist i  econ­
omiesi  of  scalel  issuei  wouldl  be more relevantl t ifi  thet  
datat  consistedi t  of  SMSAs withit  botht  branchingi  and  
nonbranchingr i  laws.l . 
4	4	 Numberr of  commercialr i l banks  and  savingsi  and  
loanl  associationsi ti  arer  obtainedt i  fromfr  Summary  off 
Accountst  and  Depositsit  (1968-1975)( - ) and  Summary
off Savingsi  Accountst  by  Geographicali l Area  
0968-1975), 	 arer(1968-19 ), respectively.r ti l . Populationl ti  datat  
fromfr  Statisticalt tisti l Abstractt t off thet  Unitedit  Statest t  
0974(19  and 1975).. Allll othert  datat  are  from tl:tetl:t  Fed­
eralr l Home Loan  Bank Boardr  (1979).( ). 
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Figure 1. Regression Estimates of the Mortgage Interest Rate Equation. 
Time Period Time Period 
Market for Market for EntryLoan-to-Growth in ­ Term-to- R2/SEMaturity Structure Structure Variable Entry Entry VariableConstant Population Value E,p TM MS	 1 E2LV 
-.14**4*  1972-1975 .34008.96' 3.07"* 7** -.01 .03"** -.15 1972 
(.18) (2.23)	 .1659(16.36)	 (1.89) (.62) (1.89) 
1972 -.04* .4513' 1972-19759.06** 2.88**8* 	 .03'** -.03-.01 " (3.56)	 .1512(18.11) ) (1.96) (.68) (1.71) (.04) 
.03** -.24 -.15** 1970-1975 .36051970 '3.38*' -.018.98* * 	 ' (2.49)	 .1633(16.69)	 (2.10) (.61) (1.82) (.30) 
-.04* 1970-1975 .46422.99*-	 .02*' -.059.08'* * -.01 * 	 1970 (3.71)	 .1495(18.39)	 (2.06) (.68) (1.66) (.07) 
-.40 1968 -.14"** 1968-1975 .3567·8.95-* 	 -.01 .03**3.57**7* 	 " (2.49)	 .1638(16.95)	 (2.20) (.51 ) (1.73) (.52) 
-.04* 1968-1975 .4657- ·9.09- 3.12-- -.01 .02**' -.28 1968* . ** 
.1490(18.41) (2.17) (.59) (1.58) (.41 )	 (3.79) 
'Denotes significance at 99"/. level 
"Denotes significance at 95% level 
" %
I·statistics in parenthesest-
The dependent variable R is calcu­ Since the loan-to-value ratio is a mea­ rates differed among different-sized in­
lated as an effective rate using the Fed­ sure of risk to firms, higher levels of stitutions already in the market. There­
eral Home Loan Bank Board's proce­ L V, ceteris paribus, are expected to af­ fore, a market structure variable at the 
dure of amortizing initial fees and fect mortgage rates positively. This re­ beginning of the period of analysis may 
lO-year lationship has be most appropriate.	 The number ofcharges over a to- period. The vari­ been shown in Schaaf 
able P is used to measure the impact of (1966) and Ostas (977).1977  The expected commercial banks and savings and loan 
population growth on mortgage interest sign of the term-to-maturity variable is associations per population at the be­
rates. This is a proxy for specifying uncertain. On the one hand, the longer ginning of the period of analysis is cho­
certain characteristics of the demand for the term, the slower that mortgage own­ sen to measure market structure. 5 
housing. It is expected that, with allll else ers earn equity, and therefore the higher Higher levels of MS should be nega­
remaining the same, there exists a posi­ the risk for mortgage lenders. On the tively related to mortgage rates. The 
tive relationship between population other hand, the longer the term, the entry variable £1 is expected to exert 
growth and mortgage interest rates. lower the risk for mortgage lenders negative impacts upon mortgage interest 
Interest rates vary with the type, matu­ since this produces lower monthly pay­ rates, while the expected sign of £2 re­
rity and risk characteristics of loans. ments. Since there exists no a priori mains an empirical question. The time 
Therefore, part of the variation in re­ reasoning to choose one explanation periods 1968-1975, 1970-1975 and 1972­
gional interest rates may result from am:" 1975 are used to measure the rate ofover the other, the expected sign is ~ 
differences in the economic characteris­ biguous. The empirical evidence on the entry. 
tics of loans rather than from differences sign of TMis mixed. For example, Jack­ Figure 1 displays the ordinary least 
in housing demand or market structure. son and Kaserman (1980) find a positive squares estimates for the reduced-form 
Two variables are selected to control for relationship between default risk on _. equation in (I).1)  The population growth 
mortgage lending risk: Loan-to-value home mortgages and term-to-maturity im­variable P always exerts a positive 
and term-to-maturity variables. whileW i  Barth, Cordes and Yezer (1979) 
find a negative relationship. 
5	• The variable MS was also specified as the number 
of offices of firms per population. Since the results 
cluding some form of market structure change. 
The model is incomplete without in­
of the analysis did not , only those equa­
tions estimated with the numbers of firms arevariable that reflects the monopoly shown. 
power of existing institutions and which 
would, in tum, influence the ability of 
new entrants to affect prices. Market 
structure could itself change as new 
banks entered the market or as growth 
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pact upon mortgage rates and is signifi­-
cantly different from zero. The loan-to­-
value variable LV always exerts  a nega­-
tive impact upon mortgage rates but  is 
not  significantly different from zero.  
The coefficients on the term-to-maturity 
variable TM  are always positive  and  
significantly different from zero. 
The coefficients on the market struc­-
ture variable MS are always negative 
but never significantly different from 
zero. This  suggests that  the market  
structure that existed at the beginning 
period of  analysis is not an important 
determinant of interest rate differentials. 
While this result is unexpected,  it  
should be noted that the MS  variable is 
included in the equation to control for 
the ability of  new entrants to affect  
interest rates.6 
The entry variable E1 and branching 
variable &. always exert a negative and 
statistically significant impact upon 
mortgage rates. These results suggest 
that, at least since 1968, entry exerts a 
competitive effect on mortgage interest 
rates. Since increased branching also re­-
sults in lower interest rates, this may be 
evidence of economies of scale in 
banking. However, since E2 may also 
8	• Longbrake and Peterson (1979) fmd that existing 
structure is not sillllificant in explaining~ketmarket gn
regIOnal mortgage rate dilferentials and suggest 
that improvement in secondary markets be a pol­-
icy objective. 
io f
include de novo branch  entry  of  institu­-
tions outside  the market, the pure scale 
economy impact may be blurred. 
IV.. CONCLUSIONS 
Within the framework of  the mortgage 
market,  this  paper  provides  two in­-
teresting  conclusions  about industry  
performance. First, it indicates that, 
with all else remaining the same, in­-
creased entry by firms serves to lower' 
interest rates  charged  to customers.  
Second, it is shown that both increases 
in the numbers of new firms and added 
branching results  in lower mortgage 
interest  rates.  This suggests  that  
branching is not  a form of nonprice 
competition but  rather may generate 
economies of scale in banking. 
One obvious implication suggested by 
the study is that relaxation of both 
chartering and branching restrictions 
will serve to enhance the performance 
I
of firms in the mortgage market. How­-
ever, the estimates of the model of 
interest rate determination are only di­-
rectly applicable to where 
r
areas W
branching already exists. The effects of 
entry in mortgage markets in unit bank­-
ing states would be a useful follow-up to 
this study. 0 
Rob­I am indebted to James R. Barth, - Schaaf, A. H., "Regional Differences in Mortgage
ert S. Goldfarb and an anonymous ref- Financing Costs,"ts," Journal of Finance (March 
1966) pp. 85-94. 
eree fore  valuable comments. States.Statistical Abstract of the United , U.S. De­-
0974partment of Commerce (19  and 1975). 
Deposits,Summary	 of Accounts and . Federal De­-
posit Insurance Corporation (1968-1975). 
Summary of Savings Accounts by Geographic 
0968­Area; Federal Home Loan Bank Board (19 -
1975). 
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